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CREDIT CARD PRICING: THE CARD ACT AND
BEYOND
Oren Bar-Gill & Ryan Bubbt
We take a fresh look at the concerns about credit card pricing and
empirically investigate whether the Credit CARD Act of 2009 (the CARD
Act) has been successful in addressing those concerns. The rational choice
theory of credit card pricing, which posits that issuers use back-end fees to
adjust the price of credit to reflect new information about borrowers' credit
risk, predicts that issuers will respond to the CARD Act by using
alternative ways to price risk. In contrast, the behavioral economics theory,
which posits that issuers use back-end fees because they are not salient to
consumers, predicts that issuers will respond by increasing unregulated
nonsalient prices. If the market is competitive, we argue that the CARD
Act should also result in increases in some salient, up-front prices. But we
show that if issuers have market power, reductions in nonsalient fees may
not result in concomitant increases in salient charges. We test these
predictions using two datasets on credit card contract terms before and
after the CARD Act rules went into effect. We find that the rules have
substantially reduced the back-end fees directly regulated by the CARD Act,
including late fees and over-the-limit fees. However, unregulated contract
terms, such as annual fees and purchase interest rates, have changed little.
Post-CARD Act, consumers continue to face high long-term prices and low
short-term prices, and imperfectly rational consumers still have difficulty
understanding the cost of credit card borrowing. We thus consider
potential improvements to the regulatory framework. We argue that
improved disclosures that provide consumers with the aggregate cost of
credit under the contract, based on information about the borrower's likely
use of credit, would improve consumer outcomes. Furthermore, we suggest
that regulators should not focus only on prices that are "too high" but
should also consider limiting the ability of issuers to charge introductory
teaser interest rates that are, in a sense, "too low."
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CREDIT CARD PRICING
INTRODUCTION
Credit card contracts have come under increased public and
political scrutiny. This scrutiny culminated in the passage, by an
overwhelming bipartisan majority, of the Credit Card Accountability,
Responsibility, and Disclosure Act of 2009 (the CARD Act)I and in
the creation, as part of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (the Dodd-Frank Act),2 of the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB).3 One of the main
concerns motivating this landmark legal reform was the pricing
structure used by many credit card issuers. Specifically, credit card
contracts commonly lure consumers with low short-term prices (e.g.,
no annual fees and zero-percent introductory or teaser rates) and
then impose high long-term prices (e.g., default interest rates and
penalty fees).
The CARD Act specifically targets this pricing structure or, more
accurately, one part of this pricing structure: it imposes limits on high
long-term prices but does not meaningfully restrict issuers' ability to
set low short-term prices. It significantly curtails interest rate
increases: teaser rates must be in place for at least six months before
the card account reverts to the higher "go-to" rate. Excluding the
expiration of teaser rates and a few other narrow exceptions, issuers
cannot increase interest rates in the first year after opening the credit
card account. Rate increases, after the first year, apply only to new
charges, not to existing balances. Long-term penalty fees have also
been substantially restricted: late fees are restricted in magnitude and
issuers may not charge over-the-limit fees unless the consumer
explicitly requests that the issuer allow transactions that take the
consumer over the credit limit. Finally, inactivity fees are banned.
4
In this Article, we take a fresh look at the concerns about credit
card pricing and empirically explore whether the CARD Act has been
successful in addressing these concerns. Based on our findings, we
offer tentative proposals for improving credit card regulation.
1 Pub. L. No. 111-24, 123 Stat. 1734 (2009) (codified in scattered sections of 5, 11,
15, 20, and 31 U.S.C. (Supp. IV 2010)).
2 Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 7, 12,
15, 18,22,31, and 41 U.S.C. (Supp. IV 2010)).
3 Consumer Financial Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. § 5301 (Supp. IV 2010).
4 See What You Need to Know: New Credit Card Rules Effective Aug. 22, BOARD
GOVERNORS FED. RES. SYS., http://www.federalreserve.gov/consumerinfo/wyntk_
creditcardrules2.htm (last updated June 15, 2010); What You Need to Know: New Credit Card
Rules Effective Feb. 22, BOARD GOVERNORS FED. RES. Sys., http://www.federalreserve.gov/
consumerinfo/wyntkcreditcardrules.htm (last updated Mar. 11, 2010). For a summary
of the CARD Act rules, see infra Table 1. Restrictions on permissible payment allocation
methods and balance calculation methods further reduce the amount that consumers pay
in long-term interest and fees.
2012]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
We begin, in Part I, by surveying existing explanations for the
low short-term prices and high long-term prices common in credit
card contracts and considering their implications for the effects of
the CARD Act. There are two main theories for why issuers charge
the high back-end fees regulated by the CARD Act-the rational
choice theory and the behavioral economics theory. Each provides a
framework for analyzing the consequences of the CARD Act.
5
We first consider the rational-choice, efficiency theory. Under
this theory, issuers use the fees and rates regulated by the CARD Act
to price risk.6 Issuers set basic purchase annual percentage rates
(APRs) for each consumer based on the issuer's initial assessment of
the borrower's risk. Consumers who are subsequently revealed to be
higher risk through their borrowing and repayment behavior under
the contract are then charged increased rates and additional fees,
such as default interest rates and late fees. The result of this ex post
repricing is that borrowers with a higher risk of defaulting pay more
for credit, resulting in a more efficient credit market.
The CARD Act restricts some of the back-end contractual
instruments available to issuers to price risk.7 The rational choice
theory thus predicts that the CARD Act will result in issuers using
alternative ways to price risk. Issuers can be expected to find
different means of ex post risk-based repricing like the cash-advance
fee. They can also be expected to engage in more ex ante risk-based
pricing. For example, in the pre-CARD Act world, some issuers,
relying on their ability to match price to risk through back-end rates
and fees, engaged in only limited risk-based pricing on the
front-end--offering the same basic APR on all approved applications
regardless of credit score or other risk characteristics. The rational
choice theory predicts that more issuers will offer risk-based pricing
5 In a recent article, Adam Levitin explores rational-choice, risk-based accounts of
rate-jacking--one important instance of high long-term prices, in our terminology.
Levitin contrasts the risk-based pricing account with an "opportunistic pricing" account
that has a behavioral economics flavor. See Adam J. Levitin, Rate-Jacking: Risk-Based &
Opportunistic Pricing in Credit Cards, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 339, 342.
6 While focusing on the risk-based pricing theory of credit card pricing, we note
another rational choice theory. According to this theory, the credit card product includes
certain optional services such as obtaining a cash advance or using the card outside the
United States. It is efficient to price these optional services separately through back-end
fees (e.g., a cash-advance fee and a currency-conversion fee). Otherwise, issuers would be
forced to cover the cost of these services by increasing the annual fee or the basic interest
rate, and cardholders who do not utilize the optional services will cross-subsidize
cardholders who do utilize these services. The cross-subsidy would also result in excessive
use of the optional services and in inadequately low use of credit cards by cardholders
who do not utilize the optional services. See OREN BAR-GILL, SEDUCTION BY CONTRACT:
LAw, ECONOMICS AND PSYCHOLOGY IN CONSUMER MARKETS (forthcoming 2012)
(manuscript at 18-20) (on file with authors).
7 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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up front since they no longer can rely on back-end prices, such as
default interest rates and late fees to effectively price risk. This
means that the variance of the basic APR can be expected to increase.
With fewer ways to price risk, the optimal contract under the
CARD Act will be less effective at pricing risk. Consequently, we
expect the average initial basic APR charged to rise, spreading the
cost of risk across all cardholders. This may also result in a reduction
in the prevalence of teaser rates. Under the rational choice theory,
the main effect of the CARD Act should be to raise the price for
actually using credit, specifically the basic APR.
Importantly, if the rational choice theory fully explains issuers'
use of high back-end fees, then the CARD Act may very well reduce
social welfare. Since the cost of unpriced risk will be spread across all
cardholders, low-risk cardholders ultimately cross-subsidize
higher-risk cardholders. This implies that high-risk consumers will
end up using credit cards excessively while low-risk consumers will
not use enough. Also, because increased risk is not priced (or not
fully priced), cardholders will undertake excessive risk-increasing
actions. And, again, to the extent that issuers cannot anticipate these
risk-increasing actions and price them ex ante, they will spread the
cost of the unpriced risk across all cardholders.
The behavioral economics theory provides a very different
explanation of the high back-end fees regulated by the CARD Act:
issuers use these fees because they are not salient to consumers.
According to the behavioral theory, imperfectly rational consumers
place excessive weight on short-term, salient prices and insufficient
weight on long-term, nonsalient prices. Faced with such biased
demand, issuers offer low short-term prices and high long-term prices
to minimize the perceived total price of their product. Losses on the
low, below-cost, short-term prices are recouped through high,
above-cost, long-term prices. Additionally, front-end benefits to
borrowers are funded by back-end costs.'
Under the behavioral theory, with the CARD Act in place, issuers
still have the same incentive to use nonsalient fees but may only do so
in a restricted manner.9 The theory thus predicts that issuers will
respond by increasing the remaining unregulated nonsalient prices
on the contract, such as cash-advance fees and rates.
Furthermore, if the restrictions on nonsalient fees are
sufficiently strong and the market remains sufficiently competitive,
we also expect an increase in salient fees, such as annual fees and
purchase APRs, and a reduction in the use of teaser rates. The
8 See BAR-GILL, supra note 6.
9 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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intuition becomes clear under the assumption of perfect
competition. In a perfectly competitive market, issuers merely break
even prior to the CARD Act rules. When the rules restricting the use
of nonsalient fees are applied, issuers have to raise other prices on
the contract, including potentially salient prices, to compensate for
the loss in revenue from the regulated contract terms. If issuers have
market power, however, they may prefer to keep unregulated, salient
prices low to maintain high consumer demand.
While the rational choice theory has trouble justifying many of
the CARD Act rules, the rules make perfect sense under the
behavioral economics theory. According to this theory, pre-CARD
Act prices were distorted: long-term, nonsalient prices were too high
and short-term, salient prices were too low. Further, though efficient
incentives require cost-based pricing, we instead had salience-based
pricing. Indeed, the CARD Act helps to correct this distortion.'0
Importantly, we do not think of the rational choice theory and
the behavioral economics theory as necessarily mutually exclusive.
Issuers could use certain contract terms both to price risk and
because they are nonsalient to consumers.
In Part II, we empirically evaluate the effects of the CARD Act on
long-term and short-term prices and describe the current state of
credit card pricing using the Federal Reserve's Report of Terms of Credit
Card Plans and a hand-coded dataset of credit card agreements. We
show that the CARD Act had its intended effect on over-the-limit fees
and late payment fees, two items that the CARD Act directly
regulates. However, credit card terms not directly regulated by the
CARD Act exhibited little change. The basic pricing structure used
in the market prior to the CARD Act, consisting of low up-front prices
and high back-end rates and fees, still remains in place. Introductory
APRs have not decreased in popularity since the CARD Act's passage.
Consumers face the same prevalence of default APRs should they fail
to keep up with their payments. The fact that contract terms not
regulated by the CARD Act did not adjust sufficiently to compensate
for the loss in revenue from the regulated terms provides evidence
that issuers have some degree of market power, perhaps stemming
from consumers' switching costs (psychological or otherwise).
Given the persistence of this pricing structure under current
rules, we conclude in Part III by exploring alternative regulatory
approaches. First, we consider the possibility of designing a total-cost
10 See BAR-GILL, supra note 6. When consumers behave in imperfectly rational ways,
even prices that reflect the social cost of credit will not generally provide optimal
incentives. See id. at 20. Consumer misperception distorts incentives, even when issuers
do not deliberately distort prices. Skewed pricing exacerbates the incentive problem. See
id. at 12. The CARD Act improves incentives by restricting skewed, salience-based pricing.
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disclosure system that would aggregate both short-term and
long-term price dimensions and thus help consumers choose
optimally between competing credit card offers. Such disclosure, if
effective, would also reduce issuers' incentives to decrease short-term
prices and increase long-term prices. Second, we consider the
possibility of directly regulating teaser rates. The CARD Act's
prohibitions currently focus on back-end fees that are arguably too
high. However, certain potential efficiency explanations do exist for
these fees, described above, creating a real concern that there may be
unintended consequences. In contrast, the CARD Act leaves
untouched up-front prices that are too low, such as teaser interest
rates. What's more, there is no convincing efficiency explanation for
low (or zero) teaser interest rates. Therefore, we should be less
concerned about the risk of unintended consequences posed by
regulating teaser interest rates.
Since the CARD Act restrictions do not seem to substantially
affect the use of teaser rates, we consider regulating them by
increasing the minimum period that any teaser rate must remain in
effect from the current six-month requirement under the CARD Act
to eighteen months (or even longer). We expect such a change will
increase offered teaser rates and lower their general prevalence. We
also consider restricting the magnitude of the permitted increase
from any teaser rate to the long-term, go-to rate. Such a restriction
can be expected to increase teaser rates, decrease long-term, go-to
rates, or both.
I
CREDIT CARD PRICING AND THE EFFECTS OF THE CARD ACT: THEORY
In this Part, we recount the rational choice, risk-based pricing
theory for the structure of credit card pricing and the behavioral
economics, salience-based pricing theory. We use these theories to
explain common pricing patterns in the credit card market,
specifically low short-term prices and high long-term prices, and to
predict the effects of the CARD Act on these common pricing
patterns. We then test these predictions empirically in Part II.
A. A Rational Choice Theory: Risk-Based Pricing
1. Revealed Risk and Adjustable Prices
Providing credit inevitably involves risk-the risk that the
cardholder-borrower will default on repayment obligations. An
optimal credit card contract prices risk and, moreover, adjusts prices
to reflect new information about risk. When an issuer decides to
supply a credit card to a specific consumer, the issuer has certain
2012]
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information about this consumer-information provided in the
credit card application, credit bureau information, etc. Based on this
information, the issuer estimates the probability that the consumer
will not repay the loan and sets the basic APR accordingly.
Over the course of the issuer-cardholder relationship, the issuer
collects an increasing amount of information regarding the
probability that the cardholder will not repay the loan. For example,
when the cardholder makes a late payment or exceeds the credit
limit, such events may indicate financial distress. A rational issuer
would incorporate this new information into any risk assessments
performed and adjust the price of credit to reflect the increased risk
of nonpayment. Thus, late fees, over-the-limit fees, and default
interest rates represent means for adjusting prices to reflect new risk
information.
2. The CARD Act
The CARD Act restricts issuers' ability to raise interest rates and
impose penalty fees." In other words, it restricts issuers' ability to
adjust the price of credit to new information about the risk of
nonpayment. How would these restrictions affect the equilibrium
pricing scheme? First, and obviously, to the extent that the CARD
Act is effectively enforced, modes of repricing that the CARD Act
bans will disappear: penalty fees exceeding limits set by the CARD Act
or its implementing regulations will no longer be observed. 2 And
the same goes for sharp increases in prescribed interest rates.
Second, given that such common repricing will effectively
disappear, issuers can be expected to search for alternative modes of
repricing. 1 According to the rational choice theory, issuers
employed late fees and over-the-limit fees because paying late and
exceeding the credit limit are indications of an increased probability
of nonpayment. Unable to use, or fully use, these indicators, issuers
will likely turn to less informative indicators. For example, if using
the card's cash-advance feature is indicative of financial distress,
issuers may respond by increasing cash-advance fees. Because the
CARD Act restricts the use of more informative indicators-such as
paying late and exceeding the credit limit-we expect issuers to rely
more heavily on less informative indicators like cardholders taking
out cash advances.
11 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
12 See Levitin, supra note 5, at 340 ("The CARD Act severely curtailed card issuers'
ability to rate-jack consumer credit cards.").
13 See Robin Sidel, Credit-Card Fees: The New Traps, WALL ST. J., Feb. 20, 2010,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SBI 0001424052748704804204575069374130248754.html
(describing new types of credit card fees after the passage of the CARD Act).
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Third, issuers can be expected to invest more in pricing risk ex
ante.14 Usually, issuers price risk most efficiently when using ex post
price adjustments. When repricing based on ex post information is
restricted, issuers turn to investing more in repayment risk
information at the application stage and to incorporating this risk in
their ex ante pricing. Specifically, we can expect greater variance in
the initial basic APR. Before the CARD Act, issuers could expend less
effort in fine-tuning the basic APR to cardholder risk because they
could count on ex post repricing. Now that the CARD Act has
restricted ex post repricing, however, issuers must resort to expending
more effort in fine-tuning the basic APR.
Finally, on a related note, issuers can be expected to increase the
basic APR. The CARD Act restricts issuers' ability to reprice risk ex
post using penalty fees and interest rate increases.' 5 As explained
above, issuers will search for alternative means to price risk-
alternative ex post repricing and more careful ex ante risk-based
pricing. But these alternatives are second-best; it appears inevitable
that the CARD Act will inhibit issuers' ability to price risk. Faced with
a reduced ability to price risk-i.e., to make risky borrowers bear the
cost of the higher risk they impose-we expect issuers to spread the
cost of the unpriced risk across all cardholders. As a result, the
average basic APR can be expected to increase.
B. A Behavioral Economics Theory: Salience-Based Pricing
Behavioral economics provides an alternative theory for credit
card pricing that focuses on the salience of different dimensions of
card contracts to consumers.
1. Low Short-Term Prices and High Long-Term Prices
Credit card issuers commonly set low short-term prices and high
long-term prices. 16 From the cardholder's perspective, this pricing
structure defers the costs of the credit card product into the future.
The behavioral economics explanation for deferred-cost contracts is
14 See Connie Prater, Card Issuers Ready to Check Cardholder Income, Assets,
CREDITCARDs.coM Uan. 22, 2010), http://www.creditcards.com/credit-card-news/credit-
card-application-income-check-1282.php (describing the methods by which credit card
issuers "will be peering more deeply into card applicants' financial affairs" after the CARD
Act goes into effect).
15 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
16 See Paul Heidhues & Botond Kbszegi, Exploiting Naivete About Self-Control in the Credit
Market, 100 AM. ECON. REV. 2279, 2279 (2010) ("[F]or most types of nonsophisticated
borrowers the baseline repayment terms are cheap, but they are also inefficiently front
loaded and delays require paying large penalties. Although credit is for future
consumption, nonsophisticated consumers overborrow, pay the penalties, and back load
repayment, suffering large welfare losses.").
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based on evidence that future costs are often underestimated. 7
When cardholders underestimate future costs, contracts with
deferred-cost features become more attractive to cardholders and
thus to issuers. Put differently, cardholders who suffer from the
underestimation bias find long-term prices nonsalient. Issuers, then,
increase these nonsalient price dimensions because they have limited
effect on demand for the credit card product. 8
Two underlying biases jointly contribute to the underestimation
of many future costs: myopia and optimism. A myopic cardholder
focuses on short-term benefits and excessively discounts long-term
costs. An optimistic cardholder underestimates any self-control
problems and the likelihood of contingencies bearing economic
hardship, resulting in the underestimation of future borrowing.
Since many long-term price dimensions in the credit card contract
depend on borrowing levels, the underestimation of future
borrowing leads to an underestimation of future costs. 19
When cardholders underestimate future costs, issuers will offer
deferred-cost credit card contracts. Consider a simplified credit card
contract with two price dimensions: a short-term price, Psr (e.g., an
introductory interest rate), and a long-term price, PLT (e.g., a
long-term interest rate). Assume that the optimal credit card
contract sets Psr = 0.1 and PLT = 0.1, as these prices provide optimal
incentives and minimize total costs. Specifically, assume that these
interest rates reflect the issuer's risk-adjusted cost of funds such that
the rates induce borrowing only if the value of borrowing to the
cardholder exceeds the cost of lending to the issuer. In this
simplified example, if cardholders are rational, issuers will offer this
optimal contract.
Now assume that cardholders underestimate future costs. For
example, assume that cardholders underestimate the likelihood of
borrowing on their credit card beyond the introductory period: while
they will actually borrow an amount of $100 both during and after
the introductory period, they think they will borrow $100 during the
introductory period but only $50 after the introductory period ends.
As a result of such misperception, issuers will no longer offer the
optimal contract. To see this result, compare the optimal contract,
17 See Oren Bar-Gill, The Law, Economics and Psychology of Subprime Mortgage Contracts,
94 CORNELL L. REv. 1073, 1119 (2009) (discussing this underestimation phenomenon in a
different context).
18 For a more detailed discussion, see BAR-GILL, supra note 6, at 3-10, 16-18; Oren
Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1373, 1395-1400 (2004).
19 See Lawrence M. Ausubel, Credit Card Defaults, Credit Card Profits, and Bankruptcy, 71
AM. BANKR. L.J. 249, 263 (1997) ("[A] substantial portion of credit card borrowing still
occurs at postintroductory interest rates... .").
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the (0.1,0.1) contract, with an inefficient, deferred-cost contract
setting PsT = 0.05 and PsT =0.16, denominated as the (0.05,0.16)
contract. Assume that under both contracts, the issuer, who operates
in a competitive market, just covers the total cost of offering the
credit card product. Under the optimal (0.1,0.1) contract, total
interest payments are: P(0.1,0.1) = 0.1. 100 + 0.1. 100 = 20 (assuming, for
clarity of exposition, that the introductory period and the
postintroductory period are one year long each and that interest is
assessed at the end of the period; time discounting is also ignored for
simplicity). Under the inefficient (0.05,0.16) contract, total interest
payments are: P(0.05,0.16) = 0.05 -100 + 0.16. 100 = 21. Total cost, and
thus total interest payments, are higher under the inefficient,
deferred-cost contract.
Now consider the cost of the credit card as perceived by the
imperfectly rational cardholder. Perceived total interest payments
under the optimal (0.1,0.1) contract are: P(0.1,0.1) = 0.1 - 100 + 0.1 -50 =
15. Perceived total interest payments under the inefficient
(0.05,0.16) contract are: P(0.05,0.16) = 0.05 • 100 + 0.16. 50 = 13.
Cardholders would prefer, and thus lenders will offer, the inefficient,
deferred-cost contract.
Our results suggest that a similar outcome-low short-term
prices and high long-term prices-also obtains in a monopoly setting.
In the absence of consumer misperception, the monopolist faces the
following dilemma: it wants to raise prices to increase its per-unit
revenue and thus total profit, but higher prices decrease the number
of units sold (i.e., decrease demand for the product, thus reducing
total profit). Misperception solves the monopolist's dilemma, at least
to a certain extent. When misperception causes consumers to
underestimate one price dimension, the monopolist will increase the
underestimated price and decrease the accurately perceived price. In
doing so, the monopolist maximizes per-unit revenues while
minimizing the accompanying reduction in demand.
2. The CARD Act
The CARD Act imposes restrictions on long-term rates and fees
that are nonsalient to cardholders. 20 By doing so, the CARD Act
restricts issuers' ability to defer costs. Thus, an effective CARD Act
should successfully change credit card pricing. Three specific sets of
changes can be expected. First, long-term rates and fees that fall
under CARD Act restrictions, such as late fees and over-the-limit fees,
should decrease.
Second, long-term rates and fees not restricted by the CARD Act
20 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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can be expected to increase. Faced with imperfectly rational
cardholders who underestimate long-term, nonsalient prices, issuers
have a strong incentive to defer costs. If the CARD Act restricts
certain types of cost deferral, issuers will search for alternative types
of cost deferral not targeted by the CARD Act. For example,
cash-advance fees and rates and foreign-transaction fees, which are
not restricted by the CARD Act, can be expected to increase.
Third, if the market is sufficiently competitive, we can expect
short-term, salient prices to increase. In the absence of legal
restrictions, issuers set high long-term prices and use revenues from
these back-end prices to fund front-end perks and thus compensate
for lower revenues, and even losses, incurred from low short-term
prices. When back-end revenues dry up due to CARD Act
restrictions, issuers may have to increase front-end, salient prices to
continue covering their costs. As noted above, issuers will try to
minimize this negative impact on back-end revenues by shifting to
back-end prices not regulated by the CARD Act. But it is unlikely that
they will entirely avoid a reduction in back-end revenues. As a result,
short-term, salient prices can be expected to increase.2' Specifically,
we can expect an increase in annual fees, introductory interest rates,
and the basic APR, which, though a long-term price, has become
increasingly salient to cardholders.
However, if credit card issuers have market power, they may not
increase their front-end, salient prices in response to the CARD Act.22
With market power, the issuer may decide to maintain low salient
prices to keep demand high. We analyze below the implications of
the CARD Act for credit card pricing under the behavioral economics
theory, focusing on the effects of market structure, using a simple
model.
3. A Simple Model
We develop a simple model designed to demonstrate that, while
legal restrictions on long-term, nonsalient prices necessarily result in
concomitant increases in short-term, salient prices under perfect
21 Consider a profit-maximizing issuer choosing between two nonsalient back-end
fees: F1 and F2. If the issuer chose to focus on Fl, that means that Fl represents the more
efficient means of extracting back-end revenues. If the CARD Act restricts the use of Fl,
the issuer will switch to F2. But F2 is less effective in extracting back-end revenues.
Accordingly, the issuer will reduce the front-end perks, and front-end prices will increase.
The issuer retains another option in the form of investing in designing a new nonsalient
term, F3, which is as effective as F1 in extracting back-end revenues. It is unlikely,
however, that the issuer will find a perfect substitute for Fl. But, again, the cost K would
need to be financed somehow-financing that will likely come from increased short-term
prices.
22 See infra Part I.B.3.
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competition, the same does not hold true when sellers have market
power. In this latter scenario, legal restrictions on long-term,
nonsalient prices will generally have a smaller effect, and in some
cases no effect, on short-term, salient prices.
Assume a simple two-dimensional pricing scheme with a
short-term, salient price pi, and a long-term, nonsalient price P2. The
consumer accurately perceives P,. Namely, the perceived price, 01,
equals the actual price, p,. The consumer underestimates the
long-term, nonsalient price. Specifically, the perceived price is P2
= 6'P2, where 0 <6 < 1. We further assume that prices are
nonnegative (i.e., p, _> 0 and P2 -> 0).23
Every consumer who chooses to purchase the product will pay a
total price of Pi + P2 (for simplicity, assume no discounting). In other
words, every consumer who purchases the product will pay P, exactly
once and P2 exactly once. The underlying, simplifying assumption is
either: (1) that prices are applied regardless of how the consumer
uses the credit card product; or (2) that every consumer who
purchases the credit card product uses the product the same way,
triggering the same prices, and that the prices themselves do not
affect the usage intensity.
However, consumers perceive the total price ex ante to be only
Pi + P2 = P1 + 6. P2. Demand for the credit card product is a function
of the total perceived price. The demand function can thus be
written as follows: q = q(p, + fi,). For simplicity, we focus on the
special case where demand is linear in the perceived total price:
q = q(p, + P 2) = 4 - a. (pi + f 2).
On the supply side, we assume that issuers face a constant
marginal cost of c. Issuer profits are given by: T(p1 , P2) = q(p + 02)
(PI + P2 - c) = [q- a" (P1 + 6" .P2)]" (P1 P2 - c).
We begin by assuming a perfectly competitive market and
consider the effects of a cap on the long-term price. In particular,
suppose that issuers may not charge a long-term price P2 greater than
some P2. The effects of such a cap in a competitive market are
described in the following proposition. (The full analysis of the
model and all proofs are relegated to Appendix 1.)
23 In this simple framework, in the absence of the nonnegativity constraints, sellers
will set P, at minus infinity and P2 at positive infinity. A more general framework would
replace the nonnegativity constraints with an assumption that setting a negative price
entails a cost for the seller (beyond the cost of paying money to the consumer)-the cost
from opportunistic behavior by consumers. In this more general framework, we could
have negative (albeit not too negative) prices, as is sometimes observed in the market
(e.g., loyalty programs can be viewed as creating a negative price for transacting). To view
further justifications for these types of price-floor assumptions, see generally Paul
Heidhues et al., The Market for Deceptive Products (Jan. 2012) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author).
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Proposition 1: Effect of a cap on the long-term price in a competitive
market.
In a perfectly competitive market, when the law imposes a
constraint p2 on the long-term price, the effects of the legal
constraint, as compared to the outcome with no constraint, depend
on the strictness of the constraint. In particular, there exists a set of
thresholds for the constraint, k, < k2, with k, = c, such that:
(a) Nonstrict Constraint. If p2 > k2 , then the legal constraint has
no effect and firms choose p, = 0 and P2 = c.
(b) Strict Constraint. If k, < P < k2, then:
i. Sellers will reduce the regulated long-term price P2 to the
lowest level permitted by law.
ii. Sellers will increase the short-term price P, to
compensate for the reduction in the long-term price P,.
iii. Demand will decrease.
(c) Very Strict Constraint. If P2 < k, then the market will shut
down.
The intuition for these results is straightforward. First, in the
absence of any cap, firms prefer to make their money through the
long-term price rather than through the short-term price because
consumers are less sensitive to the long-term price.24 However, once
a binding cap constrains the long-term price, firms must raise the
short-term price to cover their costs. In a perfectly competitive
market, firms just barely break even, so a firm that fails to raise its
short-term price in response to such a cap would go out of business.
While the total price consumers pay does not change, the price
perceived by consumers goes up (since more of it comes from the
up-front price) and hence demand goes down.
If there is market power, however, a different cap effect emerges.
To simplify, consider the polar case in which there is a single,
monopolistic seller. The following proposition summarizes the effect
of a cap on the long-term price on a monopolist.
Proposition 2: Effect of a cap on the long-term price in a monopolistic
market.
In a monopolistic market, when the law imposes a constraint P2
on the long-term price, then, compared to the no-constraint
benchmark:
(a) If the long-term price is capped below the price the
24 See supra Part I.B.1.
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monopolist would otherwise choose, the monopolist will
reduce the long-term price p, to the lowest level permitted by
law.
(b) The effect on the short-term price and on demand depends
on how strict the legal constraint is. In particular, there
exists a set of thresholds of the constraint k, < k2 < k3 , with
k, = c, such that:
i. Mild constraint. If fz > k3 , then the law has no effect on
the short-term price and demand will increase.
ii. Intermediate constraint. If k2 <_ P2 <- k3 , then the short-term
price will increase but demand will still increase.
iii. Strict constraint. If k, !S_02 < k2 , then the short-term price
will increase and demand will decrease.
iv. Very Strict Constraint. If P2 < k,, then the market will shut
down.
In the monopolist case, the results are more complicated. In the
absence of a legal constraint, the monopolist also prefers to make all
of its revenue from the long-term price since consumer demand is
less sensitive to the long-term price than to the short-term price.
25
However, unlike in the case of perfect competition, if the cap is
binding, the monopolist may not raise the short-term price. The
reason is that with a mild constraint, the increase in per-customer
revenue that an increase in the short-term price would produce is less
than the loss in revenue from the resulting reduction in demand.
Thus, a mild legal constraint on the long-term price will increase
demand for the monopolist's product. However, as the constraint
becomes progressively stricter, the monopolist will ultimately begin to
raise its short-term price.
Even over the range of legal constraints in which the monopolist
responds by increasing the short-term price, the monopolist will
adjust short-term price less than will firms in a perfectly competitive
market. We formalize this point by comparing the effect of the legal
constraint across the two market structures in the following
proposition.
Proposition 3: When the legally imposed cap rests in the
k1:5 P2 5 k2 range, the cap will cause firms in a perfectly competitive





The intuition for this result is straightforward: In a competitive
market, for every dollar decrease in P2 caused by the legal constraint,
sellers must raise p, by a dollar (to cover their costs). In a
monopolistic market, such a large increase in p, is not necessary since
the monopolist is making a positive profit. The legal constraint
clearly reduces the monopolist's profit. When recalibrating its
pricing strategy in response to the legal constraint, the monopolist
trades off the benefits of an increase in pl-a larger per-unit revenue
(or a smaller decrease in per-unit revenue)-against the costs of such
an increase in terms of reduced demand. Accordingly, the
monopolist will increase p, by a smaller amount as compared to
sellers in a competitive market.
26
Perfect competition and monopoly represent only the two polar
cases. Real-world markets, including the credit card market, fall
somewhere in between. Despite housing a large number of
competing firms, the credit card market has exhibited some degree
of supracompetitive pricing, a point made in an influential paper by
Laurence M. Ausubel in 1991.27 According to Ausubel, one source of
market power in the credit card market stems from the cost to
consumers of searching for a better credit card and switching
between cards. 28 As costs of switching away from an issuer (to a
competing issuer) rise, so does the issuer's market power.
Whatever the source of market power in the credit card market,
we conjecture that the results derived from the comparison of the two
polar cases of monopoly and perfect competition apply more
generally. Namely, the legal constraint on P2 has a smaller effect on
p, and on demand when the issuer has more market power.
From a welfare perspective, the fact that the increase in p, is
smaller in magnitude than the reduction in P2 implies that consumers
enjoy part of the surplus that the monopolist (or issuer with lesser
market power) lost. Moreover, as pricing shifts from misperceived
price dimensions to accurately perceived price dimensions, the total
26 Our assumption of linear demand plays a role in this result. Under perfect
competition, the reduction in the nonsalient price always passes through dollar for dollar
to the salient price, no matter what the shape of the demand function. With linear
demand, a monopolist passes through less than 100% of the change in the nonsalient
price. But if the demand function is sufficiently concave in the relevant region, a
monopolist can possibly pass through more than 100% of the change in the nonsalient
price. The argument is that market power represents one reason why incomplete, or even
zero, pass through may occur.
27 Laurence M. Ausubel, The Failure of Competition in the Credit Card Market, 81 AM.
ECON. REV. 50, 75-76 (1991).
28 See id. at 68-70; see also Paul S. Calem & LorettaJ. Mester, Consumer Behavior and the
Stickiness of Credit-Card Interest Rates, 85 AM. EcON. REV. 1327, 1328-29 (1995) (discussing
Ausabel's theory in greater detail); Victor Stango, Pricing with Consumer Switching Costs:
Evidence from the Credit Card Market, 50J. INDUS. ECON. 475, 475-92 (2002).
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effect of consumer bias on consumer decision making is reduced-to
the benefit of consumers.2 This effect is present in both competitive
and monopolistic markets.
II
CREDIT CARD PRICING AND THE EFFECTS OF THE CARD ACT: EVIDENCE
In this Part, we first seek to provide some suggestive evidence on
the causal effect of the CARD Act, an ambitious goal given the other
macroeconomic events that occurred during the period in which the
CARD Act's rules took effect. In pursuing this goal, we mainly rely on
a simple before-after comparison to provide evidence on the effect of
the CARD Act. Households' borrowing behavior and financial
institutions' lending behavior were of course affected by the financial
crisis over this period, so the before-after comparisons must be
interpreted with caution. Still, we think the data discussed below
showing sharp changes upon the passage of the CARD Act provide
convincing evidence that the Act had the intended effect on the
contract terms directly regulated under it. Less clear, however, is
whether the before-after comparisons on terms not directly regulated
by the CARD Act, which reflect much smaller changes, are properly
attributable to the CARD Act.
Our second goal is more straightforward: we seek simply to
describe the current state of credit card pricing. The behavior of
credit card issuers under current rules sheds light on the scope for
further improvements to credit card regulation.
The new rules imposed on credit card issuers under the CARD
Act were phased in at the beginning of 2009. Starting on the
effective date of the CARD Act, August 22, 2009, issuers were
required to give forty-five days' notice for certain rate and fee
increases. 30 On February 22, 2010, a set of additional rules went into
effect including restrictions on interest rate increases in the first year
of new credit card accounts and an opt-in requirement for
over-the-limit transactions and fees.3' On August 22, 2010, another
set of rules went into effect including restrictions on late payment
fees and a ban on inactivity fees.3 2 In Table 1 of Appendix 2, we
provide the key provisions that went into effect on each date.
29 The difference between the actual total price and the perceived total price is
(PI + P2) - (PI + 6 P2) = (1 - 8)- Pz. This difference is decreasing in P2.
30 See Prater, supra note 14.
31 See What You Need to Know: New Credit Card Rules Effective Feb. 22, supra note 4.




We use two sources of data on the terms of credit card contracts.
The first is the Federal Reserve's Report of Terms of Credit Card Plans
(TCCP).3 3 The TCCP data have been collected semiannually since
1990 from the twenty-five largest bank issuers of credit cards and an
additional 125 issuers. Respondents include commercial banks,
savings and loans, and savings banks, but do not include credit
unions or finance companies that do not issue credit cards through a
bank or thrift.3 4 The survey asks issuers to report the primary pricing
terms for the largest consumer credit card plan offered by the issuer
available to new customers.3 5 Terms collected include the purchase
APR, late-payment fee, over-the-limit fee, whether the issuer offers an
introductory interest rate, and whether the issuer uses double-cycle
billing.
An advantage of the TCCP data is that they provide a long time
series, giving us rich information about the historical evolution of the
terms of credit cards. We focus on the period beginning with the July
31, 2001, survey and ending January 31, 2011, the most recent survey
available. The survey suffers from the disadvantage of only providing
information about a limited set of terms with only limited
information about each term. For example, issuers that offer a range
of APRs based on the riskiness of the cardholder are instructed to
report only the midpoint of the range of APRs, and issuers only
indicate whether an introductory rate is available and not what the
introductory APR and the length of the introductory period are.
Moreover, in working with the data, it became apparent that issuers'
responses to the TCCP survey are sometimes incomplete and
inaccurate. For example, magnitudes of certain fees are sometimes
missing for issuers that, we suspect, do charge these fees.
36
Accordingly, we coded a new dataset on the terms of credit card
contracts available just prior to the February 22, 2010, phase-in of
CARD Act rules as well as after the August 22, 2010, phase-in of the
final set of CARD Act rules. Our source of credit card contracts stems
from the CARD Act itself. The CARD Act requires credit card issuers
33 See FED. RESERVE SYS., SUPPORTING STATEMENT FOR THE REPORT OF TERMS OF
CREDIT CARD PLANS 1 (Apr. 9, 2010), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
BoardDocs/ReportForms/formsreview/FR2572.20051005.omb.pdf. To access data from
the semiannual survey of credit card plans, including in Microsoft Excel format, see Credit
Cards: Sumey of Credit Card Plans, BOARD GOVERNORS FED. REs. SYS., http://www.
federalreserve.gov/creditcard/survey.html (last updated Mar. 2, 2012).
34 FED. RESERVE SYS., supra note 33, at 3 n.5.
35 See FED. RESERVE SYS., REPORT OF TERMS OF CREDIT CARD PLANS-INSTRUCTIONS 2





to provide the full text of their credit card agreements to the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve (the Board).37 The Board has
made available on its website the most recent set of agreements
provided to it.38 The first batch of agreements was provided on
December 31, 2009, but is no longer available on the website.
However, the Board provided the earlier set of contracts to us in
response to a Freedom of Information Act request.
This credit card agreements database is advantageous for us in
two ways: first, it includes all types of credit card issuers, including
credit unions; second, we can code a large set of terms by reading the
agreements directly. We randomly selected twenty-four credit union
issuers and twenty-five investor-owned issuers (e.g., commercial
banks, savings and loans, etc.) from the 389 issuers for which we have
agreements. Table 2 of Appendix 2 contains the list of issuers in our
data. For each issuer, we coded the corresponding agreement
provided for December 31, 2009, as our pre-CARD Act observation
and the earliest agreement provided after the August 22, 2010,
effective date of the final set of CARD Act rules as our post-CARD
Act observation. Thus, our "pre-CARD Act" observations are in fact
contracts offered after the CARD Act's August 22, 2009, effective date
but prior to the bulk of the rules under the CARD Act taking effect.
The limited rules that took effect immediately in August 2009 will
generally bias our estimates toward not observing an effect of the
CARD Act. Thirty-six selected issuers had to be discarded and
replaced with a new randomly selected issuer because either a pre- or
post-CARD Act agreement was not provided or was provided but was
incomplete.
A weakness of both datasets is that they do not provide
information on the number of customers that use each contract.
Thus, we cannot detect a shift in the number of customers at each
issuer governed by the contract that we coded. One possibility is that
issuers responded to the CARD Act not by changing the overall menu
of contract terms available but by shifting more customers into
particular credit card contracts. However, we can detect only menu
changes, not changes in the fraction of customers that use each card
within the menu. This is a substantial limitation of our empirical
analysis. A more definitive evaluation of the CARD Act would require
data on the number of active accounts for each set of contract terms
offered by each issuer. Still, we think our inquiry into the menu of
contract terms offered by firms is informative.
37 See 15 U.S.C. § 1632(d) (2) (Supp. IV 2010).
38 See Credit Cards: Interactive Tools and Features, BoARD GOVERNORS FED. RES. Sys.,
http://www.federalreserve.gov/creditcard (last updated Nov. 10, 2010).
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In comparing the results between the two datasets, it is
important to keep in mind that credit unions are present in the
agreements dataset but not in the TCCP data. Credit unions use very
different pricing structures than do investor-owned credit card
issuers, with far lower back-end fees and penalties. 39 This makes both
the average level of fees and the change in fees before and after the
CARD Act lower in the agreements database than in the TCCP data.
We provide a subgroup analysis breaking out the results for
investor-owned issuers and credit unions separately.
B. Contract Terms Directly Regulated by the CARD Act
We begin with contract terms that are directly regulated by the
CARD Act.
1. Over-the-Limit Fees
Beginning February 22, 2010, credit card issuers may not charge
fees to a consumer for exceeding the credit limit unless the consumer
has explicitly opted in to the issuer's over-the-limit service.
40
Moreover, credit card issuers may now charge only one over-the-limit
fee per billing cycle. 41 Figure 1 shows that issuers have dramatically
lowered their over-the-limit charges in response. The figure plots the
average of credit card issuers' over-the-limit fees for each date in the
TCCP data starting from the beginning of our sample period in July
2001. The steady increase in the use of over-the-limit fees over the
previous decade is evidenced by the upward slope of the plot until
2009. The average over-the-limit fee thereafter sharply drops from
$26 in July 2009 down to $12 by January 2011. The three vertical
lines in the figure are drawn at the three key effective dates for rules
under the CARD Act: August 22, 2009, February 22, 2010, and August
22, 2010.
39 See Ryan Bubb & Alex Kaufman, Consumer Biases and Firm Ownership 30 (NYU Ctr.
for Law, Econ. & Org, Working Paper No. 11-35, 2011), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1945852.
40 See What You Need to Know: New Credit Card Rules Effective Feb. 22, supra note 4.
41 See id.
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FIGuRE 1: AVERAGE OVER-THE-LIMIT FEES OVER TIME
2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011
Date
Notes: Dashed lines represent 95% confidence interval. Source: TCCP data.
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Table 3 provides the sample means for selected contract terms
pre- and post-CARD Act from the agreements data as well as the
difference in means. For each variable, we restrict the sample to
issuers for which we have over-the-limit fee data in both the pre- and
post-CARD Act observations.
TABLE 3. POOLED SAMPLE
(1) (2) (3)
Pre-CARD Act Post-CARD Act Difference
Over-the-Limit Fee ($) 16.72 5.98 -10.74***
(N=49) (2.21)
Maximum First Late Fee ($) 30.54 25.57 -4.98***
(N=44) (0.96)
Maximum Subsequent Late Fee ($) 31.09 29.26 -1.83**
(N=44) (0.72)
Intro APR Offered? 0.20 0.22 0.02
(N= 49) (0.02)
Intro APR (%) 3.96 3.46 -0.50
(N=9) (0.52)
Purchase APR (%) 14.30 14.75 0.45
(N= 48) (0.27)
APR Range (%) 9.73 9.51 -0.22
(N= 48) (0.60)
Balance Transfer APR (%) 14.57 14.41 -0.16
(N= 24) (0.41)
Balance Transfer Fee (%) 1.18 1.31 0.12
(N=49) (0.11)
Cash Advance APR (%) 17.08 18.11 1.03***
(N=38) (0.38)
Cash Advance Fee (%) 1.86 1.98 0.12
(N=49) (0.16)
Default APR (%) 22.51 22.80 0.29
(N=14) (0.29)
Foreign Transaction Fee (%) 1.25 1.35 0.10
(N=49) (0.11)
Annual Fee ($) 17.63 13.01 -4.62
(N=49) (5.10)
Returned Payment Fee ($) 26.94 24.44 -1.49
(N= 49) (1.25)
Notes: Sample sizes denote the number of issuers. For each variable, we only include issuers
for which the variable is nonmissing in both the pre-CARD Act and post-CARD Act
observations. Standard errors clustered at the issuer level in parentheses in column (3).
Source: Agreements database. (***) significant at 1%, (**) significant at 5%, (*) significant at
10%.
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In the agreements data, we see a similar drop in over-the-limit
fees, from $16.72 to $5.98. Tables 4 and 5 break out these results for
the credit union and investor-owned issuer subgroups, respectively.
Both types of issuers exhibited a similar drop in over-the-limit fees
charged.
TABLE 4. CREDIT UNION SUBGROUP
(1) (2) (3)
Pre-CARD Act Post-CARD Act Difference
Over-the-limit Fee ($) 13.69 3.33 -10.35***
(N=24) (2.45)
Maximum First Late Fee ($) 24.89 23.68 -1.21
(N=19) (0.90)
Maximum Subsequent Late Fee ($) 24.89 24.87 -0.03
(N=19) (1.02)
Intro APR Offered? 0.21 0.25 .04
(N=24) (0.21)
Intro APR (%) 7.05 7.05 0.00
(N=4) (2.42)
Purchase APR (%) 13.83 14.22 0.39**
(N=24) (0.15)
APR Range (%) 7.35 7.66 0.30
(N=24) (0.42)
Balance Transfer APR (%) 14.50 14.09 -0.40
(N=13) (0.58)
Balance Transfer Fee (%) 0.08 0.17 0.08
(N=24) (0.08)
Cash Advance APR (%) 14.31 14.58 0.27*
(N=20) (0.14)
Cash Advance Fee (%) 0.71 0.83 0.13
(N=24) (0.09)
Default APR (%) 19.38 19.40 0.02
(N=5) (0.02)
Foreign Transaction Fee (%) 0.88 1.04 0.17
(N=24) (0.12)
Annual Fee ($) 1.54 1.54 0.00
(N=24) (1.61)
Returned Payment Fee ($) 20.96 20.27 -0.69
(N=24) (1.88)
Notes: Sample sizes denote the number of issuers. For each variable, we only include issuers
for which the variable is nonmissing in both the pre-CARD Act and post-CARD Act
observations. Standard errors clustered at the issuer level in parentheses in column (3).
Source: Agreements database. (***) significant at 1%, (**) significant at 5%, (*) significant at
10%.
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TABLE 5. INVESTOR-OWNED ISSUER SUBGROUP
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(1) (2) (3)
Pre-CARD Act Post-CARD Act Difference
Over-the-limit Fee ($) 19.64 8.52 -11.12**
(N=25) (3.71)
Maximum First Late Fee ($) 34.84 27.00 -7.84***
(N=25) (1.29)
Maximum Subsequent Late Fee ($) 35.80 32.60 -3.20***
(N=25) (0.93)
Intro APR Offered? 0.20 0.20 0.00
(N= 25) (0.12)
Intro APR (%) 1.49 0.59 -0.90
(N=5) (0.95)
Purchase APR (%) 14.77 15.29 0.51
(N=24) (0.53)
APR Range (%) 12.12 11.37 -0.74
(N=24) (1.13)
Balance Transfer APR (%)14.66 14.79 0.14
(N=11) (0.60)
Balance Transfer Fee (%)2.24 2.40 0.16
(N=25) (0.21)
Cash Advance APR (%)20.16 22.03 
1.88**
(N=18) (0.76)
Cash Advance Fee (%) 2.96 3.08 0.12
(N=25) (0.32)
Default APR (%) 24.25 24.69 0.44
(N=9) (0.46)
Foreign Transaction Fee (%) 1.61 1.65 0.04
(N=25) (0.18)
Annual Fee ($) 33.08 24.02 -9.06
(N=25) (10.06)
Returned Payment Fee ($) 32.67 30.40 -2.28
(N=25) (1.69)
Notes: Sample sizes denote the number of issuers. For each variable, we only include issuers
for which the variable is nonmissing in both the pre-CARD Act and post-CARD Act
observations. Standard errors clustered at the issuer level in parentheses in column (3).
Source: Agreements database. (***) significant at 1%, (**) significant at 5%, (*) significant at
10%.
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2. Late Payment Fees
Beginning August 22, 2010, issuers cannot charge a late payment
of more than $25 unless one of the borrower's previous six payments
had also been late, in which case the fee can be up to $35.42 Figure 2
shows that issuers had steadily increased their late payment fees over
the previous decade but, upon passage of the CARD Act, started
decreasing late payment fees, from $27 in July 2009 down to $12 in
January 2011.
FiGuRE 2: AVERAGE LATE FEE OVER TIME
09
C'
2001 20112003 2005 2007 2009
Date
Notes: Dashed lines represent 95% confidence interval. Source: TCCP data.
In the contracts provided in the agreements dataset, issuers
commonly structure late fees based on the size of the borrower's
outstanding balance and, since the CARD Act, commonly charge less
for the first late payment than for subsequent late payments within six
months. We thus coded the maximum fee charged under the
contract for the borrower's first late payment as well as the maximum
fee charged for subsequent late payments within six months of the
first late payment.
Table 3 shows that issuers' first late payment fee decreased by
42 See What You Need to Know: New Credit Card Rules Effective Aug. 22, supra note 4.
Issuers can also charge a higher late payment fee if they can show that the costs it incurs
justify the size of the fee.
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about $5 after the CARD Act's restrictions went into effect, from
$30.54 to $25.57. But the late fee charged for subsequent late
payments fell by only $1.83. Tables 4 and 5 show that these declines
are largely due to investor-owned issuers who, on average, lowered
their maximum first late payment fee by $7.84 and their subsequent
late payment fee by $3.20.
3. Double-Cycle Billing
As of February 22, 2010, issuers can only impose finance charges
on balances in the current billing cycle and may not use
"double-cycle billing," which entails calculating the balance by
looking back two billing cycles.43 Figure 3 shows a growing minority
of issuers used double-cycle billing over the previous decade, but the
practice sharply dropped from 8% of issuers as ofJanuary 2008 to less
than 1% of issuers by July 2009. This drop actually preceded the
effective date of the ban on double-cycle billing.
FIGuRE 3: PERCENTAGE OF ISSUERS USING DOUBLE-CYCLE BILLING OVER
TIME
2001 2003 2005 2007 2009
Date
Notes: Dashed lines represent 95% confidence interval. Source: TCCP data.
C. Unregulated Up-Front Prices
We now turn to prices that we expect are salient to consumers at
the time of contract choice but are not directly regulated by the
CARD Act.




Figure 4 shows that annual fees had generally been in decline
over the previous decade, from a high of $18 on average inJuly 2002
to a low of $12 in January 2008. But since the passage of the CARD
Act, annual fees have risen somewhat, reaching $15 in January 2011.
The agreements dataset, however, shows no statistically significant
change in annual fees. On the whole, then, these two datasets
suggest that annual fees have not substantially increased following the
phase-in of the CARD Act rules.
FIGuRE 4: AVERAGE ANNUAL FEES OVER TIME
01
0
2001 2003 2005 2007 2009
Date
Notes: Dashed lines represent 95% confidence interval. Source: TCCP data.
Our findings are largely consistent with other research. For
example, a report by the Pew Charitable Trusts on the effect of the
CARD Act found that the prevalence of annual fees declined slightly
from 2009 to 2010, from 15% of all surveyed cards down to 14%."'
However, they did find that, for cards that charged an annual fee, the
median annual fee rose from $50 to $59 for banks cards.
45
Focusing on a narrow subset of card accounts that had been
44 See PEW HEALTH GRP., Two STEPS FORWARD: AFTER THE CREDIT CARD AcT,






opened less than twelve months prior, a report by Argus Information
and Advisory Services found that 25.5% of all new accounts in the
third quarter of 2010 charged an annual fee compared to only 11.1%
in the third quarter of 2009.46 And an analysis by the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) found a large rise in the fraction
of subprime credit cards that charge an annual fee, from 4% in
January 2009 to 21% by the end of 2010.
4 7
The data as a whole, however, paint a picture of no substantial
change in annual fees during and after the CARD Act phase-in. In
particular, the OCC found no significant change in issuers' annual
fee revenue from July 2009 to November 2010.4
2. Purchase APRs
Figure 5 shows the average purchase APR spread (the APR
charged under the contract minus the Wall Street Journal prime rate
used as the index for most variable rate cards) reported by issuers in
the TCCP data. Purchase APR spreads began to increase as the
financial crisis ensued in 2008, rising from 6% in July 2007 to 10% in
January 2011. The figure vividly illustrates why a simple before-after
comparison for purchase APRs is not a credible approach to
estimating the precise causal effect of the CARD Act; other factors
affecting APRs, first and foremost the riskiness of credit card lending,
were changing over the period as well and need to be accounted for.
So, while the TCCP data show that APRs increased by about one
percentage point-from 9% in July 2009 just prior to the CARD Act
to 10% in January 2011 4 9-other macroeconomic market changes
confounded the effect of the CARD Act. The agreements data show a
0.45-percentage-point increase in the purchase APR after the CARD
Act rules took effect, 50 but this difference is not statistically
significant.
46 See Michael Heller, Argus Info. & Advisory Servs., The CARD Act-One Year Later:
Recent Trends in the Credit Card Industry, CFPB 5 (Feb. 22, 2011),
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/2011/03/Argus-Presentation.pdf.
47 Jennifer Faulkner, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, The CARD Act-One
Year Later: Impact on Pricing and Fees, CFPB 6 (Feb. 22, 2011),
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/2011/03/OCC-Presentation.pdf.
48 See id. at 9.
49 See infta Figure 5.
50 See infta Figure 5.
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FIGuRE 5: AVERAGE REPORTED PURCHASE APR SPREAD OVER TIME
0
CLA
20112001 2003 2005 2007 2009
Date
Notes: Dashed lines represent 95% confidence interval. Source: TCCP data.
Our findings are consistent with the findings from other studies.
The OCC report, for example, provides the distribution of APRs on
accounts and shows only a very slight, rightward shift of the
distribution after the CARD Act was phased in, 5' consistent with the
small changes we see in our agreements data.
We also coded the range of APRs charged by each issuer. Many
contracts state that the purchase APR is based on the
creditworthiness of the borrower and quote the range of APRs
available. We calculated the APR range as simply the difference
between the highest and lowest purchase APR available across all
credit card contracts provided by the issuer at each date. This is a
simple measure of the extent to which issuers price credit risk ex ante.
Table 3 shows no statistically significant difference in APR range after
the CARD Act rules went into effect for the entire sample.
3. Introductory APRs
Figure 6 shows that there has been little change in the fraction of
issuers that offer an introductory APR. This fraction has varied
between 18% and about 26% over the past ten years. Of the issuers
who responded to the TCCP survey in January 2011, 21% offered
51 See Faulkner, supra note 47, at 3-5.
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introductory APRs. The post-CARD Act observations in the
agreements dataset show that 22% of issuers in the sample offer
introductory APRs, with no statistically significant change as the
CARD Act was phased in. For contracts that offered introductory
APRs, the APR offered was, on average, 3.46% in the post-CARD Act
agreements data. Tables 4 and 5 show that investor-owned issuers
offer much lower introductory rates than do credit unions. With the
important caveat that our sample is very small, the five
investor-owned issuers that offered introductory APRs post-CARD Act
offered a rate of 0.59% on average as compared to 7.05% for the four
credit unions that offered an introductory APR.
FIGURE 6: PERCENTAGE OF ISSUERS USING INTRODUCTORY APRs OVER
TIME
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APRs is thus greater than reflected in our agreements data.
Other studies similarly find no decrease in the use of
introductory APRs. For example, the Argus report shows a
substantial increase in the use of introductory purchase APRs to attract
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new customers, with 17.8% of new accounts having an introductory
purchase APR in the third quarter of 2009 compared to 33.4% in the
third quarter of 2010.52 A report by Andrew Davidson of Mintel
Comperemedia on the CARD Act shows that introductory
balance-transfer APR terms are becoming more generous due to
longer introductory periods.
5 3
4. Balance-Transfer APRs and Fees
The TCCP data do not include information about
balance-transfer APRs and fees. The agreements data show that there
has been little change in the terms for balance transfers as the CARD
Act rules were phased in. 54 Table 3 shows that post-CARD Act,
issuers in the sample, on average, charged balance-transfer APRs of
14.43% and balance-transfer fees of 1.28%.
D. Unregulated Back-End Prices
We now turn to contract terms not regulated by the CARD Act
that consumers likely do not view as salient when choosing among
different credit card products.
1. Cash-Advance APRs and Fees
Though the TCCP survey does not collect data on cash-advance
APRs, issuers are asked about cash-advance fees. Figure 7 shows that
cash-advance fees have trended upward from about 2.5% in the early
2000s to over 3% by 2011. The upward trend appears to have leveled
off since the passage of the CARD Act in 2009.
52 See Heller, supra note 46, at 6.
53 See Andrew Davidson, The Supply of Credit in the Card Market, MINTEL
COMPEREMEDIA 13 (Feb. 22, 2011), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/2011/03/
Comperemedia-presentation.pdf.
54 See supra Table 3.
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FIGURE 7: AVERAGE CASH ADVANCE FEE OVER TIME
2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011
Date
Notes: Dashed lines represent 95% confidence interval. Source: TCCP data.
The agreements data show that cash-advance APRs have
increased as the CARD Act was phased in by about one percentage
point, from 17% to 18%, as reflected in Table 3. While this change is
statistically significant, it is possible that other events that occurred
over this period, not the CARD Act, induced the change. One way to
increase our confidence that this increase in cash-advance APRs is
due to the effect of the CARD Act is to use a difference-in-difference
analysis using credit unions as a control group. Credit unions charge
much lower back-end fees and prices55 and hence are likely to be less
affected by the CARD Act rules. They are, however, affected by
general macroeconomic and market changes. We thus estimate the
amount by which investor-owned issuers increased their cash-advance
APRs over and above the amount by which credit unions changed
their cash-advance APRs. Tables 4 and 5 show only a small
0.27-percentage-point increase in credit unions' average cash-advance
APR compared to a 1.88-percentage-point increase among investor-
owned issuers. The difference-in-difference estimate of 1.61
percentage points is statistically significant (p-value of 0.04). In
contrast, cash-advance fees did not change significantly over the
period.56
55 See Bubb & Kaufman, supra note 39.






The TCCP survey does not collect information on default APRs,
which are used to calculate finance charges when the borrower has
been delinquent on payments for a specified period of time. The
agreements data show no change in default APRs over the period,
with the average default APR (among issuers who charge a default
APR) at 22.8% post-CARD Act.
5 7
3. Foreign-Transaction Fees
The TCCP survey also does not collect information on foreign
transaction fees. We coded these for the agreements data and found




Returned-payment fees are also not provided in the TCCP data.
In the agreements data, we found no significant change in such fees
over the period. They averaged $24.44 for our post-CARD Act
contracts. 5
9
E. Credit Card Issuers' Revenues and Profits
Overall, through our data, we saw significant reductions in two
types of fees directly regulated by the CARD Act that provide a
substantial source of revenue for credit card issuers-over-the-limit
fees and late fees-but no substantial increases in other credit card
rates and fees to compensate for the consequent loss in fee revenue.
Our findings are corroborated by the fall in interest and fee revenues
reported by credit card issuers over the period.
The dramatic fall in overall fee revenue is shown in the OCC's
report on the CARD Act.60 While the nine largest issuers in the
OCC's data earned a total of about $1.8 billion in fee revenue in the
month ofJuly 2009, this number fell to under $1 billion by November
2010.61 Similarly, the Argus report shows a reduction in gross
effective asset yield from 18.6% in the third quarter of 2009 to 17.8%
in the third quarter of 2010.62 The gross effective finance charge
yield also fell over the same period from 12.8% to 12.3%.63 A report
57 See supra Table 3.
58 See id.
59 See id.
60 See Faulkner, supra note 47, at 9.
61 Id.
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by Credit Suisse on credit card issuer profitability shows a similar fall
in profit margins of large credit card issuers from 10% in the third
quarter of 2009 to 8.8% in the third quarter of 2010.64
In their public filings, large credit card issuers attribute the fall
in revenues and profits over this period to the CARD Act. For
example, Capital One reported a decline in noninterest income from
$3.7 billion in 2009 to $2.7 billion in 2010 that it said was "primarily
attributable to a reduction in penalty fees resulting from the...
CARD Act and a reduction in customer accounts." 65 Another large
issuer, JPMorgan Chase & Co., estimated that its net income would be
reduced by $750 million annually due to the CARD Act's
restrictions.
66
The fact that credit card issuers did not increase their other
charges to fully compensate for the loss in fee revenue stemming
from the restrictions of the CARD Act suggests that issuers enjoy
market power. As explained in Part I, in a competitive market,
restrictions on nonsalient, back-end prices lead to concomitant
increases in unregulated, salient prices. In contrast, when issuers
64 Moshe Orenbuch, Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC, Credit Card Profitability Under
Pressure, CFPB 2 (Feb. 22, 2011), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/2011/03/Moshe-
Orenbuch-Credit-Suisse-presentation.pdf.
65 Capital One Fin. Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 40-41 (Dec. 31, 2010).
66 SeeJPMORGAN CHASE & CO., 2010 ANNUAL REPORT: THE WAY FORWARD 79 (2011),
available at http://investor.shareholder.com/jpmorganchase/annual.cfm (follow "2010
Complete Annual Report" hyperlink). JPMorgan Chase further explained that
[t] he most significant effects of the CARD Act include: (a) the inability to
change the pricing of existing balances; (b) the allocation of customer
payments above the minimum payment to the existing balance with the
highest annual percentage rate ("APR"); (c) the requirement that
customers opt-in in order to receive, for a fee, overlimit protection that
permits an authorized transaction over their credit limit; (d) the
requirement that statements must be mailed or delivered not later than
21 days before the payment due date; (e) the limiting of the amount of
penalty fees that can be assessed; and (f) the requirement to review
customer accounts for potential interest rate reductions in certain
circumstances.
Id. Bank of America reported a similar effect in its 2010 Annual Report, reporting that
[t]he CARD Act legislation contains comprehensive credit card reform
related to credit card industry practices including significantly restricting
banks' ability to change interest rates and assess fees to reflect individual
consumer risk, changing the way payments are applied and requiring
changes to consumer credit card disclosures. The provisions of the CARD
Act negatively impacted net interest income and card income during
2010, and are expected to negatively impact future net interest income
due to the restrictions on our ability to reprice credit cards based on risk,
and card income due to restrictions imposed on certain fees. The 2010
full-year decrease in revenue was approximately $1.5 billion.
BANK OF AMERICA CORP., OPPORTUNITIES ARE EvERYWHERE: 2010 ANNUAL REPORT 62
(2011), available at http://media.corporate-ir.net/media-files/irol/71/71595/reports/
2010AR.pdf.
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have market power, the indirect effect on unregulated, salient prices
is weaker and, in some cases, there will be no such effect at all. Our
empirical analysis-finding only limited effects on unregulated,
salient prices-suggests that at least some issuers have market power.
Given this market structure, the CARD Act likely redistributed
surplus from issuers to consumers.
67
F. Summary and Implications
Since the passage of the CARD Act, consumers now face much
lower over-the-limit fees and modestly lower late fees. However, the
basic structure of credit card pricing remains much as it was prior to
the CARD Act. Column (2) of Tables 3, 4, and 5 provides a snapshot
of credit card pricing after the CARD Act rules went into effect for
our entire sample, for credit unions, and for investor-owned issuers,
respectively. Issuers continue to use introductory rates to attract new
borrowers, and issuers continue to charge high default APRs when
consumers cannot keep up with the minimum payments due on their
cards. Our findings are broadly consistent with other studies that
have attempted to empirically assess the effects of the CARD Act on
credit card pricing.68
While we view the CARD Act as a definite improvement, high
long-term prices and low short-term prices remain prevalent, and
imperfectly rational consumers still find it difficult to understand the
cost of credit card borrowing.
III
BEYOND THE CARD ACT: PROPOSALS FOR IMPROVED CREDIT CARD
REGULATION
Part II has shown that low upfront prices and high back-end
prices persist post-CARD Act. Under the rational choice theory, high
back-end prices are welfare increasing since they are used to
67 See supra Part I.B.3.
68 See JOSHUA M. FRANK, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, CREDIT CARD CLARIY:
CARD ACT REFORM WORKS 2 (2011), http://www.responsiblelending.org/credit-
cards/research-analysis/FinaICRL-CARD-Clarity-Report2-16-11.pdf (finding an increase in
price transparency for credit card consumers); JOSHUA M. FRANK, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE
LENDING, DODGING REFORM: AS SOME CREDIT CARD ABUSES ARE OUTLAWED, NEW ONES
PROLIFERATE 2 (2009), http://www.responsiblelending.org/credit-cards/research-
analysis/CRL-Dodging-Reform-Report-12-10-09.pdf (noting several ways credit companies
have tried to make up losses from the CARD Act through alternative fees); PEW HEALTH
GRP., A NEW EQUILIBRIUM: AFTER PASSAGE OF LANDMARK CREDIT CARD REFORM, INTEREST
RATES AND FEES HAVE STABILIZED (2011),
http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Credit-Cards/Repo
rt.Equilibrium web.pdf; PEW HEALTH CRP., supra note 44, at 1-2 (finding that, while




implement efficient risk-based pricing.69  Under the behavioral
economics theory, high back-end prices are part of a welfare-reducing
pattern of salience-based pricing.70 Low front-end prices are another
part of this welfare-reducing pricing scheme.7' And, unlike with high
back-end prices, the rational choice explanation for low front-end
prices seems weak, as we elaborate below. These conclusions suggest
that it is useful to consider potential improvements to the regulatory
framework for credit cards.
The potential improvements that we consider can increase
welfare regardless of whether one believes the rational choice story or
the behavioral economics story. We begin by proposing to rethink
the mandatory disclosure regime governing credit card issuance.
Our proposed disclosure mandates are designed with the imperfectly
rational cardholder in mind, but they can also reduce the cost of
collecting information for the perfectly rational cardholder and, in
any event, should not substantially harm the perfectly rational
cardholder. 2 Moreover, enhanced disclosure does not stand in the
way of efficient risk-based pricing. Our second policy proposal
targets the low upfront prices. According to the behavioral
economics theory, these prices are part of a welfare-reducing pricing
scheme, and they lack a convincing rational choice explanation.
A. Disclosure
Traditionally, disclosure mandates were the regulatory technique
that dominated credit card regulation. The CARD Act stays the
course in this regard, retaining the historical focus on disclosure.
73
But it also moves beyond disclosure, restricting-even banning-
certain practices.74  The concern about distorted pricing-high
long-term, nonsalient prices and low short-term, salient prices-can
be addressed by well-designed disclosure mandates. This, however,
requires a new disclosure paradigm. We begin by briefly describing
the traditional approach to disclosure and why it failed. We then
highlight recent disclosure regulations that mark the beginning of a
shift to the new disclosure paradigm. We conclude this subpart with
some tentative suggestions for continuing and enhancing this
69 See supra Part I.A.
70 See supra Part 1.B.
71 See id.
72 See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 145-46 (rev. & expanded ed. 2009); Colin
Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Case for "Asymmetric
Paternalism," 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211, 1219-21 (2003); Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H.
Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 1159, 1161-63 (2003).
73 See 15 U.S.C. § 1637(i) (Supp. 1V 2010).





Traditional credit card disclosures provide disaggregate
product-attribute information. Different rates and fees are disclosed,
most prominently in the famous Schumer Box.75 The imperfectly
rational consumer finds it difficult to aggregate this information into
a single measure that would effectively guide credit card choice76 : Is a
card with a high interest rate and a low annual fee better than a card
with a low interest rate and a high annual fee? Is a card with an
attractive teaser rate for purchases and a high interest rate for cash
advances better than a card with no teaser rate and a lower interest
rate for cash advances?
Moreover, product-attribute information-information on rates
and fees-is insufficient; consumers need information on how often
these rates and fees will be triggered (i.e., product-use information).
The relative importance of the interest rate and the annual fee
depends on how much the consumer will borrow. And the relative
importance of the teaser rate for purchases and the interest rate for
cash advances depends on how many dollars' worth of purchases the
consumer is going to finance during the introductory period and
how many dollars will be needed from cash advances.
The shortcomings of the traditional disclosure paradigm suggest
the contours of a new disclosure paradigm. This new paradigm
should be based on two principles: (1) aggregate disclosures that (2)
incorporate product-use information. 7
7
2. Steps in the Right Direction
Recent developments in credit card regulation and beyond are
moving credit card disclosure in the right direction. The importance
of disclosing product-use information is beginning to be recognized.
The Dodd-Frank Act imposes a general duty, subject to rules
prescribed by the new CFPB, to disclose information, including usage
data, in markets for consumer financial products.
7
75 See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-929, CREDIT CARDS: INCREASED
COMPLEXITY IN RATES AND FEES HEIGHTENS NEED FOR MORE EFFECTIVE DISCLOSURES TO
CONSUMERS 17 (2006).
76 See id. at 54.
77 This new approach, at least with respect to aggregation, is not really new. The
traditional justification for the APR disclosure is to provide a total cost of credit measure
to help consumers who cannot aggregate the different price dimensions on their own.
This view of the APR as an aggregate, total cost of credit disclosure has been more
prominent in the mortgage context than in the credit card context. See Camerer et al.,
supra note 72, at 1233-34.
78 See 12 U.S.C. § 5533 (Supp. IV 2010).
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The minimum payment disclosure mandated by the CARD Act
similarly recognizes the importance of product-use information. The
CARD Act requires that issuers disclose a minimum payment warning
on a consumer's monthly bill, including the time it would take to pay
off the balance and the aggregate total payment if the consumer were
to pay only the minimum amount each month.79 The CARD Act also
requires that issuers calculate and disclose the monthly payment
required to pay off the cardholder's balance in three years and the
savings, in total payments, from this faster repayment schedule.80 The
minimum payment disclosures combine product-attribute
information with certain use patterns specified by the CARD Act and
implementing regulations-slower repayment (making only the
minimum payment) and faster repayment (paying off the balance in
three years).
Recent regulations also recognize the importance of disclosing
aggregate information. Federal Reserve Board regulations, which
took effect along with the CARD Act-implementing rules, require
that issuers disclose, on the monthly statement, monthly and
year-to-date totals of interest charges and fees separately.8' This
provides an example of an aggregate disclosure regime that combines
individual-use information and product-attribute information.
3. Continuing in Stride
These recent developments, while promising, can be improved.
Consider the disclosure of monthly and year-to-date totals of interest
charges and fees. First, disclosing a single total-cost figure can be
more effective than disclosing two separate figures-one for interest
and one for fees. Second, though year-to-date figures make sense for
monthly statement disclosures, they contain limited use information.
Issuers could be required to provide a year-end summary with total
annual cost figures based on a longer history of use patterns, perhaps
for the trailing three years.
Finally, to facilitate competition, these aggregate disclosures that
combine product-attribute information with product-use information
need to be provided by new issuers, as well. Of course, a new issuer
does not have the same product-use information as the consumer's
current issuer. To level the playing field, regulators could require
that the current issuer provide, in electronic form, detailed use
information that could then be transferred to new issuers or to
79 See What You Need to Know: New Credit Card Rules Effective Feb. 22, supra note 4.
80 See id.




intermediaries. Alternatively, new issuers could be required to
disclose expected aggregate costs based on statistical, average-use
information of other consumers who hold the same card.
A well-designed aggregate disclosure that combines
product-attribute and product-use information can address the
concern about distorted credit card pricing. Consider a total-cost
disclosure that aggregates both short-term and long-term price
dimensions, properly weighted using information on the consumer's
specific use patterns. Such a disclosure helps consumers to optimally
choose between competing credit card offers and would also reduce
the incentive of issuers to decrease short-term prices and increase
long-term prices. If consumer choice is guided by a disclosure that
aggregates short-term and long-term costs, a pricing scheme that
shifts costs to back-end, long-term price dimensions will no longer
cause consumers to underestimate the total cost of the credit card
product. The proposed disclosure will bypass the temporal bias in
consumei decision making and thus mitigate the temporal bias in
credit card pricing.
B. Targeting Teasers
Another potential step regulators should consider is to impose
restrictions on teaser rates. As explained above, in theory, restricting
back-end prices-the approach adopted by the CARD Act-can also
lead to higher front-end prices (i.e., less generous teaser rates) .
82
Our empirical analysis suggests that this theoretical prediction did
not materialize or at least that the effect on front-end prices was
relatively weak.83 Direct regulation of teaser rates may thus be worth
considering.
1. The Trouble with Teasers
For the most part, the new restrictions on credit card contracts
imposed by the CARD Act target fees and rates that are in some sense
"too high." For example, the CARD Act imposes limits on how high
late fees can be and restricts the number of over-the-limit fees issuers
can charge to one fee per billing cycle. 84 Indeed, restricting fees that
are too high represents an intuitive approach to credit card contract
regulation.
But from a behavioral economics perspective, there is actually a
stronger case to be made for regulating interest rates that are in some
sense "too low," specifically introductory, or teaser, interest rates.
82 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
83 See supra Table 3.
84 See 15 U.S.C. § 1666i-2 (Supp. V 2010).
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The behavioral theory posits that issuers offer teaser interest rates to
lower the perceived price of a given contract. 85 Teaser rates lower the
perceived price to consumers because many of them are optimistic
about their ability to pay off an accumulated balance at the
expiration of the introductory period and consequently
underestimate the probability that they will continue to carry a
positive balance after the introductory period expires.A
6
A consequence of low teaser rates is that consumers have an
incentive to borrow too much during the introductory period. 87 To
see this, consider a consumer who is offered a credit card with a 0%
introductory interest rate for twelve months with a go-to rate of 18%
at the end of the introductory period. The 0% teaser rate looks like
free money. A rational consumer would exploit this offer by shifting
spending on to the card and investing the borrowed funds in an
interest-bearing savings account. At the end of the introductory
period, this rational consumer could simply pay off the balance on
the card, close the account, and pocket the accumulated interest in
the savings account.
Consider what happens if the consumer instead is optimistic and
underestimates the probability of carrying a balance after the end of
the introductory period. In exploiting the offer, the consumer hopes
to take advantage of the interest-free loan for a year. But, in fact, the
consumer will ultimately not have the cash on hand to pay off the
balance at the end of the introductory period. Because the consumer
thinks borrowing is free, the consumer will run up an excessively high
balance. The overborrowing produced by teaser rates lowers
consumer welfare. 88 Such overborrowing also reduces social welfare:
when the price of credit is set below the cost of credit to the issuer,
consumers will borrow even when the benefit of borrowing is lower
than the cost of credit.89 Discouraging teaser rates, then, is a sensible
regulatory goal.
The best evidence, arguably, that teaser interest rates result in
consumer mistakes comes from a randomized experiment conducted
by Laurence M. Ausubel and Haiyan Shui. 90 They use data from a
85 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
86 See supra Part I.B.1.
87 See Heidhues & K6szegi, supra note 16, at 2288 (noting that during the
introductory period, a borrower excessively borrows due to unrealistic repayment
assumptions and short-term bias).
88 See id. at 2280-81.
89 See id. at 2288-89 (noting that, because the borrower "underestimates [the] cost"
of a loan relative to consumption benefits, overall welfare decreases drastically due to
misprediction and thus costly repayment).
90 Haiyan Shui & Lawrence M. Ausubel, Time Inconsistency in the Credit Card
Market 4-5 (Jan. 30, 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at
[Vol.97:9671006
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large credit card issuer that randomly assigned a set of preapproved
potential new customers to receive different credit card offers.91 The
key comparison is between the group that received an offer of a 4.9%
interest rate for six months with a go-to rate of 16% and the group
that received an offer of a 7.9% interest rate for twelve months, also
followed by a go-to rate of 16%.92 Substantially more consumers
offered the lower 4.9% teaser for a shorter period accepted the offer
than did consumers offered the higher 7.9% teaser for a longer
period. Moreover, Ausubel and Shui track consumers' actual
borrowing and payment behavior under the cards and find that the
group with the lower but shorter-term teaser rate pays on average
about $50 more in interest than they would have paid with the higher
but longer-term teaser rate card. Furthermore, most customers in
their data do not switch out of the contract after the expiration of the
teaser rate even when they are carrying a balance. These data are
consistent with consumers underestimating the probability of
continuing to carry a balance after the introductory period expires as
well as with the existence of substantial switching costs.
Importantly, our proposed regulation pertains only to teaser
interest rates, not other forms of discounts found in credit card
contracts, such as waivers of annual fees for the first year. Teaser
interest rates both distort incentives and exploit the specific difficulty
consumers have in estimating the probability that they will continue
to borrow under the card after the teaser rate period expires, leading
to overborrowing. 93 Other forms of discounts, such as no annual fees,
are less problematic and, given consumer switching costs, may
represent healthy price competition, as discussed below.
2. The Risk of Unintended Consequences
In contrast to regulating high back-end fees, regulating teaser
rates creates little risk of unintended consequences. As discussed
above, a theoretically plausible efficiency rationale exists for high
back-end fees on credit cards: they may be used to efficiently price
risk.94 Consequently, there is a real concern that restrictions on high
back-end fees, like those in the CARD Act, may result in the
unintended consequence of a less efficient credit card market.
Because issuers cannot price risk as effectively, they must spread the
http://www.ausubel.com/creditcard-papers/time-inconsistency-credit-card-market.pdf.
91 See id. at 7.
92 See id. at 3, 8-9.
93 Id. at 3, 9; see Heidhues & K6szegi, supra note 16, at 2288-89 (noting that the
borrower with a teaser rate in the introductory period both mispredicts repayment and
size of switching fees after the introductory period).
94 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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cost of risk across more borrowers. In consequence, less risky
borrowers will face inefficiently high interest rates, distorting their
use of credit cards. Moreover, credit card issuers may simply stop
lending to certain high-risk borrowers.
In contrast, we are aware of no plausible efficiency rationale for
teaser rates. We know of only two potential theories for how credit
card teaser rates might serve a social function but do not think either
theory provides a plausible mechanism by which regulating teasers
could have negative unintended consequences. The first such theory
considers teaser rates to be the natural form price competition takes
when consumers face switching costs. 95 The second posits that initial
discounts to new customers might serve as a way for firms to
overcome asymmetric information about the quality of their
product.96 We consider each in turn.
a. Paying Customers to Switch
One explanation for credit card issuers' use of teaser rates is that
they are the result of switching costs among consumers. There is a
well-developed literature in industrial organization examining the
implications of switching costs for market pricing.97 An important
result in this literature is that the presence of switching costs provides
an incentive for firms to charge new customers a lower price than
existing customers. In effect, firms are paying customers to switch.
Banning differential pricing for new and existing customers can thus
increase firm profits but lower consumer welfare. 98
Applying these insights to the credit card market, some scholars
have argued that teaser rates are how credit card issuers pay
customers to switch. 99 This raises the concern that regulating teaser
rates would result in less price competition in the credit market and
ultimately harm consumers.
95 See, e.g., Joseph Farrell & Paul Klemperer, Coordination and Lock-In: Competition with
Switching Costs and Network Effects, in 3 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 1967,
1970 (Mark Armstrong & Robert Porter eds., 2007) ("Lock-in hinders customers from
changing suppliers in response to (predictable or unpredictable) changes in
efficiency .... [Therefore, f] irms compete ex ante for this ex post power, using penetration
pricing, introductory offers, and price wars.").
96 See Ausubel, supra note 19, at 262-63.
97 See, e.g., Farrell & Klemperer, supra note 95, at 1989.
98 See id. at 2053.
99 See, e.g., Stango, supra note 28, at 477-79 (explaining, with the use of an empirical
model, how credit market firms set prices and teaser rates together to capture
consumer-switching-cost idiosyncrasies and thus gain market share); see also Victor Stango,
Competition and Pricing in the Credit Card Market, 82 REV. ECON. & STAT. 499, 503 (2000)
(noting that "variable-rate" firms, which comprise roughly sixty percent of the credit card




Banning teaser rates, however, would not in fact prevent credit
card issuers from paying customers to switch. There are many
alternative ways for issuers to pay customers to switch in order to
overcome consumers' switching costs. For example, they could
simply give new customers cash or a cash equivalent. This is, indeed,
a common practice. JPMorgan Chase & Co. currently offers a waiver
of its $95 annual fee for new customers for its Chase Sapphire
Card. 00 There is no reason why issuers can only pay customers to
switch through a temporary interest-free loan (i.e., by offering a
teaser rate). In fact, as argued above, luring new customers by
offering interest-free loans reduces welfare: it distorts use decisions,
resulting in excessive borrowing and leads imperfectly rational
consumers to underestimate the total cost of the card.10' Paying
customers to switch with cash or cash equivalents avoids such
distortions. Consequently, the potential explanation for teaser rates
based on the benefits of paying customers to switch does not pose a
serious concern of unintended consequences from regulating teasers.
b. Asymmetric Information About Product Quality
Another functional explanation sometimes offered for discounts
to new customers is that consumers do not know the quality of firms'
products and hence firms use initial discounts to induce consumers
to try their product and discover its high quality.10 2 The story goes as
follows: Consider a market for a product in which there is variation in
the quality of different firms' products but consumers lack reliable
indicators of quality. The only way to learn about a firm's product is
to try it. Hence, firms offer a "trial period discount" of some sort as
an inducement for consumers to give the product a try. Firms then
set the go-to price of the product high enough to recoup the costs of
these initial discounts.103
This seems like a perfectly plausible explanation for initial
discounts in many markets. Most of us have indulged in free trial
samples of products and the like, from soap to Chinese food at the
airport food court. It may also explain initial discounts on
subscription services such as cable television and magazines where
consumers are uncertain about the service's quality or value.
We find this theory implausible, however, as an explanation for
teaser rates on credit cards for the simple reason that there is little
100 Chase Sapphire Preferred Rewards Credit Card, CHASE SAPPHIRE,
https://creditcards.chase.com/sapphire/credit-cards/sapphire-preferred-card (last
visited Mar. 19, 2012).
101 See supra notes 84-93 and accompanying text.
102 See Ausubel, supra note 19, at 262-63.
103 See id. at 263.
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uncertainty about the "quality" of a credit card. Credit card issuers
lend consumers money. And, after all, money is money. There surely
is some variation among credit card issuers in customer service, but
this dimension of a credit card is relatively inconsequential. Most of
us experience the customer service of a credit card issuer only rarely.
Indeed, we posit that consumers call their credit card issuers so
infrequently that they are unlikely to learn much about their
customer service during the teaser rate period.
There is thus no plausible theoretical account for how regulating
credit card teaser interest rates could lead to undesirable outcomes.
Given the inefficient incentives and consumer mistakes produced by
credit card teaser rates, we think serious consideration of teaser
regulation is warranted.
3. Taming Teasers
How might we go about regulating teaser interest rates?
Prohibiting issuers from offering attractive introductory interest rates
poses a potential political problem: rational consumers, as well as
naive consumers who think they are rational but in fact are harmed
by teaser rates, undoubtedly like getting 0% interest rate offers.
10 4
Fashioning a palatable regulation of teasers requires finessing this
political problem through appropriate framing of the restriction.
The best approach may be to require issuers not to raise interest
rates from any initial teaser rate for a sufficiently long period so that
offering 0% APRs is no longer attractive to issuers. The CARD Act
imposes a limited restriction along these lines. The CARD Act
currently requires that any promotional rate on a credit card remain
in place for at least six months. 0 5 We propose that the minimum
term for teaser rates be increased to eighteen months, or even
longer. This would make teaser rates much more costly to issuers. In
particular, the cost to issuers of rational consumers taking advantage
of teaser rates and then closing the account when the rate expires will
be much higher if the teaser must remain in place for three times as
long or more. An advantage of this approach in terms of political
feasibility is that it is framed as a restriction on increases in interest
rates rather than as a ban on low introductory interest rates.
Another approach would be to restrict the magnitude of any
104 Patrick L. Warren & Daniel H. Wood, Will Governments Fix What Markets
Cannot? The Positive Political Economy of Regulation in Markets with Overconfident
Consumers 18 (Nov. 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1605146 (arguing that consumers will not generally support regulation that
prevents exploitation of consumer biases because they perceive the costs of such
regulation to outweigh the benefits).
105 15 U.S.C. § 1666i-2(b) (Supp. IV 2010).
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increase from a promotional rate to a go-to rate. For example, issuers
could be prohibited from increasing the APR by more than, say, five
percentage points upon expiration of a promotional rate. This would
ban issuers from offering, for example, a 0% introductory APR
combined with a go-to APR of 15%.
Either of these approaches would help eliminate the distortive
effects of teaser rates and promote social welfare.
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
APPENDIX 1
Appendix 1 contains the full analysis of the model outlined in
Part I.B.3. We start with the perfect competition case, then proceed
to the monopoly case, and finally compare the two cases.
a. Perfect Competition
A seller operating in a perfectly competitive market seeks to
maximize demand by minimizing the perceived total price while
satisfying its participation constraint. 10 6  Formally, the seller
minimizes Pi + P2, subject to nr(p 1,p 2 ) = [q - a. (P1 + 8. P2)] (PI + P2 - c)
0. We further assume that prices are nonnegative, i.e., P, - 0 and
P2 -> 0. 107 The seller's problem reduces to: Min (P, + 8 P2) s.t-P1 + P2 -> C
and the nonnegativity constraints. Solving this problem, we find that
the seller will set pNLC = 0 and pNLC = c (the superscript "NLC" denotes
the benchmark case, in which the monopolist faces "No Legal
Constraint" in its pricing strategy). With these prices, demand for the
product will be: qNLC = q - a . 8. c.
Now assume that the law limits the permissible level of P. to p2 <
c. Faced with such a legal constraint, the seller will set pLC = c - p2 and
pC = 2 (the superscript "LC" denotes the "Legal Constraint"). With
these prices, demand for the product will be: qLC = q - a .6. c- a-NLC < a~c-4 demand is zero (or
(1 - 6). (c- P2) < qNLC. Note that when Pi2 a. (d- e)
negative), and the market shuts down.
These results are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition Al: In a perfectly competitive market-
(a) Without a legal constraint, sellers will set pNLC = 0 and pNLC = c,
and demand will be qNLC = 4 - a . c.
(b) With a legal constraint P2 !5 P2 (where P2 < c), sellers will set
LC and C LPi =C- 2 and p2c= 2 <c, and demand will be qLC = 4 .- a8.
c - a. (1 - 5). (c - P2).
a'c-q
(c) With a very strict legal constraint, P2 < ( , the market shuts
down.
Corollary Al summarizes the effects of the legal constraint on
pricing and demand.
Corollary Al: In a perfectly competitive market, when the law
imposes a legal constraint P2 -< #1 (where P2 < c)-
106 See ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMIcs 271-72 (7th ed.
2009).
107 See supra note 23 for comments on an alternative to this simplified framework.
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(a) The Regulated Price, p,: sellers will reduce p2, as compared to
the no-constraint benchmark, to the maximum level
permitted by law.
(b) The Unregulated Price, p,: sellers will increase pi, as
compared to the no-constraint benchmark, to compensate
for the reduction in P,-
(c) Demand, q-. demand will decrease, as compared to the
no-constraint benchmark.
b. Monopoly
The monopolist seller maximizes 7r(pP 2 ) = [q- a. (P + SP2)
(PI + P2 - c), subject to P1 ; 0 and P2 - o. The first order conditions
(ignoring, for the moment, the nonnegativity constraints) are:
al(P P2 ) - a" (P1 + P2 - c) + [q/- a. (p , + 8P2)]
api
8ft(P1, p 2 )a a"6"(Pl P)-_ (p + P2 - 0) + [4/- a - (PI + 15'P2)]
aP2
The first thing to note is that for all p, and P2,
Oar(p1 ,p2) Or(P1 ,P2)
This means that the monopolist always prefers raising P2 (if it can) to
raising pl. By increasing P2, the monopolist gets the same per-unit
increase in revenue as it would get from increasing p, with a smaller
reduction in demand. Accordingly, without any legal constraint on
the ability to raise P2, the monopolist will set pNLC = 0 and a P2 that
solves a0Y 1=0'P2 ) = 0, or:
OP2
-a. 6. (P2 - c) + [q- a 6 P2] = 0
Solving for P2, we obtain plLC - q+a6c. (We assume that 2 ca
which reduces to q > a. 6 . c; otherwise, there would be no market for
the product.) With these prices, demand for the product will be
NLC 6 q+a.8.c
2.a.6
Now assume that the law limits the permissible level of P2 to
P2 <P2Lc = q+a.c adding another constraint, P2 < P2,  to the
monopolist's maximization problem.
As explained above, the monopolist always prefers to raise P2.
Therefore, the legal constraint is binding, and the monopolist will set
P2 = P2. But now it is possible that the monopolist will also want to
set a positive p,. To explore this possibility, we calculate the derivate
of profits with respect to P, at Pi = 0, given P2 = #2:
aT01,P2) = -a. (P2 - c) + [4 - a. 5. P2] = q - a. (1 + 6). P2 + a. c
0• L= - t- ~
This derivative is positive if and only if P2 < q+ac Note that
q+a-c q+a.6.c asupio ht.
a.(16 < ._-_a-6 (given our assumption that q > a- 6 c). We thus have
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two cases: q~a~c i+a.6.c
(1) Mild Legal Constraint: Q+a.c- < P2 <2-a-6c. 'When the legala.(1+&) -- 2.a.6 "
constraint is mild, ao (P , )[ < 0,
a pi Ip1=0
and the monopolist will set: pC = 0 and pLC = P2. With these prices,
demand for the product will be qLC = 4 - a . 6. P2 > qNLCil+a.c We h ea
(2) Stricter Legal Constraint: P2 <.(1+ When the legal
constraint is stricter,
a, r(P , 2)] > O,
a P ' IP1=0
the monopolist will set a positive Pl. Specifically, solving the first
order condition:
air(pl, P2)
ap = a (P1+P2 - )+[q-a (p+& .P2)]= O
we obtain:
LC = -a' +6) P2 + a c
S=a >0
Case 2 needs to be further divided into the following subcases:
(2a) Intermediate Legal Constraint: c < P2 < Note that
C a(1.76) (given our assumption that q a .6. c). With an
intermediate legal constraint, the monopolist will set
Pi= q-.(1+).+,c > 0 and p2f = P2. With these prices, demand for the
2,
product will be qLC = _ a, (pLC + 6 '2) > qNLC.
I .18 + P 22).Ntetata-
(2b) Strict Legal Constraint: a c- c Note that < C_ a. 1- .( P2 )-
(given our assumption that q _ a. 6. c). With a strict legal constraint,
the monopolist will set pLC = q-a.(1+6),)P+a.c > 0 and pLC = p2. With these
2.a
prices, demand for the product will be qLC - 4- a. (pLC + 6 P2) - qNLC.
The expressions for the two prices and for the demand (i.e., the
quantity sold) are the same as with an intermediate legal constraint.
The difference is that with a strict legal constraint, demand for the
product decreases, as compared to the no-constraint benchmark.
(2c) Very Strict Legal Constraint: P2 < amc-q The preceding
analysis and the resulting prices,
LC = q-a.(l+6>5 2+a-c > 0
Pt 2-a
and pa = P2 , apply only as long as we don't hit the monopolist's
participation constraint, ir(pl, p2) 0, which boils down to P1 + P2 !C
When P- ac-q the participation constraint is binding, and theWhen #2 -a.(1-6)'
monopoly case converges with the perfect competition case. The
monopolist will set
LC > q-a.(1+6).p2 +a-c
Pi C -#2> 2-a
and P2C = p, and demand will be qzC = - a 6 c - a. (1 -6). (c - P2) <
qNLC. But, as in the perfect competition case, nonnegative demand
a nc-r scannot be sustained when 02 < a.1-), a d the market huts down.
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The results are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition A2: In a monopolistic market-
(a) Without a legal constraint, the monopolist will set pNLC = 0
and LC - _+a. . and demand will be qNLC - 4 _ a 6 2 a.6.c
-'2.a6 "2.a.8
(b) With a legal constraint, P2 _ P2 (where P2 < .a.
i. With a Mild Legal Constraint, q -+a < P2 < .-/a8c' themonopolist will set pLC = 0 and pLcP2, and demand will
be qLC =q- a .'.P 2 > qNLC.
ii. With an Intermediate Legal Constraint, c < P2 < theii.C q-a'(1+6)'52+a 'c  a.(1+8)
monopolist will set Pf = a .ac> 0 and PIC = P2, and
demand will be qLC = 4 _ a . (pLC + 5.12) > qNLC.
iii. With a Strict Legal Constraint, a--) < P2 _ c, the
monopolist will set
LC _ -a.( +,).2+a_ c > 0
Pi 2-a >
and pLC = p2, and demand will be qLC = - a . (pLC + 6. 2) _
NLC
q
iv. With a Very Strict Legal Constraint, P2 - a.(1-6)' the market
shuts down.
Corollary A2 summarizes the effects of the legal constraint on
pricing and demand.
Corollary A2: In a monopolistic market, when the law imposes a
legal constraint P2 -P2 (where P2 < .. ,
(a) The Regulated Price, P2: sellers will reduce P2, as compared
to the no-constraint benchmark, to the maximum level
permitted by law.
(b) The Unregulated Price, pl: • 4 +a~c < q+a.6.c _
i. When the legal constraint is mild, a.q1 < P2 < .- -, the
a+6) - 2-a-6
law will not affect pl. The monopolist will set pi = 0 with
and without the legal constraint.
ii. When the legal constraint is stricter (intermediate or
Strict), a-c-1 <- qj la~c
strict), <- P2 < .-1+6)' the law will induce the
monopolist to increase pi, as compared to the
no-constraint benchmark.
(c) Demand, T
i. When the legal constraint is mild or intermediate,
C < P2 < 4.---I-c, demand will increase, as compared to the
no-constraint benchmark.
ii. When the legal constraint is strict or very strict, P2 -< C,




c. Perfect Competition vs. Monopoly
The results derived above can be used to compare the perfect
competition case and the monopoly case. The comparison is
summarized in Corollary A3.
Corollary A3:
Q+a.5.c
(a) When c5 _p/5 < q2.a.-
i. In the perfect competition case, the legal constraint has
no effect (since sellers in a perfectly competitive market
do not price above c).
ii. In the monopoly case, the legal constraint will result in a
lower P2; P, will remain at zero if the legal constraint is&+a.c 11+a 6c
mild, :+a < P!5 < .-a., and will increase if the legal
- +a. < q+a.6.c. ;
constraint is intermediate, C P2 q+6c _ , and
demand will increase.
(b) When ac- <2 < C,
a.(1-6)
i. In the perfect competition case, the legal constraint will
result in a lower P2, a higher pl, and reduced demand.
ii. In the monopoly case, the legal constraint will result in a
lower P2, a higher Pi, and reduced demand.
iii. The increase in p, and the decrease in the demand will
be larger in the perfect competition case.
(c) when P2 -~.~-~,q the market shuts down in both the perfect
competition and monopoly cases.
Most of the results summarized in Corollary A3 follow
immediately from Corollary Al and Corollary A2. The results in part
(b) (iii) of the Corollary require further proof. Starting with the
effect of the legal constraint on p,: In the perfect competition case












The effect is larger in the competition case since !+__ < 1. The relative
2
effect on demand follows from the relative effect on p, since P2 is the
same in both the perfect competition and monopoly cases.
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APPENDIX 2
TABLE 1. EFFEcTvE DATES OF SIGNIFICANT CARD ACT RULES
Effective Date Provisions Source
May 22, 2009 CARD Act signed into law Credit CARD Act of 2009,
Pub. L. No. 111-24, 123 Stat.
1734 (2009).
Aug. 20, 2009 45-day notice requirement for certain rate and fee Sec. 101, § 123.
increases; requirement to notify consumers of their right
to cancel the card without penalty before the increases
become effective.
21-day notice requirement for periodic payment Sec. 106, § 163.
statements.
Feb. 22, 2010 Rate increases on outstanding balances forbidden with Sec. 101, § 171.
exceptions for teaser rates, variable APR cards, and the
conclusion of temporary hardship periods.
Changing the available methods of obligor's repayment Sec. 101, § 171.
forbidden with exceptions for five year amortization and
periodic payment plans.
Rate increases for fixed-rate cards generally forbidden for Sec. 101, § 172.
the first year; "promotional" (teaser) rates must stay in
place for at least six months.
Opt-in requirement for over-the-limit transactions and Sec. 102, § 127.
fees; double-cycle billing prohibited.
Payments in excess of the minimum must be applied first Sec. 104, § 164.
to the balance with the highest interest rate.
Creditors required to consider obligor's ability to pay Sec. 109, § 150.
before opening credit card account or increasing the
credit limit.
New minimum payment warning/disclosure. Sec. 201, § 127.
Internet posting of standard credit card contracts. Sec. 204, § 122
Total fees during the first year of the account must not Sec. 105, § 127.
exceed 25% of the total credit line (excluding late fees,
over-limit fees, and returned-payment fees).
Aug. 22, 2010 Rate increases must be re-evaluated every six months. Sec. 101, § 148.
Magnitude of penalty fees restricted; Federal Reserve Sec. 102, § 149.
Board niles implementing this are:
Fees based on violation of account terms may not exceed 12 C.F.R. § 226.52(b) (1) (i)
a reasonable proportion of the total costs incurred by (2010).
card issuer as a result of those types of violations. Card
issuers must reevaluate and adjust these fees every twelve
months.
Safe Harbors (fees presumed to be reasonable): $25 for a Id. § 226.52(b)(1)(ii).
violation of account terms, $35 for a second violation of
the same type within six billing cycles, 3% of delinquent
balance on accounts that require the payment of
outstanding balances in full at the end of each billing
cycle.
Fees that exceed the dollar cost associated with the Id. § 226.52(b) (2)(i) (A).
violation are prohibited.
Fees that do not have a dollar cost to card issuer are Id. § 226.52(b) (2) (i) (B).
prohibited, including: fees on transactions the issuer
refuses to authorize, inactivity fees, and account
termination fees.
Multiple fees based on a single event or transaction are Id. § 226.52(b) (2) (ii).
prohibited. I
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TABLE 2. LIST OF ISSUERS IN THE AGREEMENTS DATASET
Credit Unions
Altra Federal Credit Union
America's First Federal Credit Union
City County Credit Union of Fort Lauderdale
DuPage Credit Union
Educational Community Credit Union
Educational Employees Credit Union
FirstLight Federal Credit Union
Grow Financial Federal Credit Union
HAPO Community Credit Union
Langley Federal Credit Union
Navy Federal Credit Union
Notre Dame FCU
Pen Air Federal Credit Union
SEFCU
Seven Seventeen Credit Union, Inc.
Sharonview Federal Credit Union
South Carolina Federal Credit Union
Spokane Teachers Credit Union
SRP Federal Credit Union
Talbots Classics National Bank
United Nations FCU




1st Financial Bank USA
American Express Bank, FSB
Applied Bank
Bank of the West
Barclays Bank Delaware
Capital One Bank (USA), National Association
Citibank (South Dakota) N.A.
Credit One Bank N.A.
Discover Bank





HSBC Bank Nevada, N.A.
Iberia Bank FSB
INTRUST Bank, N.A.
Lexus Financial Savings Bank





Wells Fargo Bank NA
Zions Bank
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